Attributed metadata history
Up to 100 retained publisher events per page for 1b27c5b7b99d3ce0a7addf83e70bda2536d0ec9f78d5b0d13139490cc45762ec. Withdrawals and unavailable references remain attributed to their publishers.
intelligence_src_d11443da85ea659d49
observed · 2026-10-12 15:37:04 UTC
Azure iPaaS services, such as Logic Apps, separate the Control Plane (management) from the Data Plane (execution), but a flaw in this model enabled undetectable data harvesting. An attacker with Azure Reader access to workflow run history can silently extract sensitive data from executions, including secrets and API responses. This is possible because execution details are exposed via the Control Plane, bypassing Data Plane access controls. The root cause of this issue is the unintended exposure of runtime data through metadata endpoints, which could allow an attacker to passively collect information without triggering alerts or requiring direct execution privileges.
Fingerprint: cd0c2519f07df6b0732e511b215d4e644a67fa786009bee7d9290dc7d5e527fd
intelligence_src_d11443da85ea659d49
observed · 2026-10-12 15:37:03 UTC
available
Fingerprint: 46fd50ac705e064c7517d97d61b5ec511c9b1ada6209622159dd39573ba08e5c