Attributed metadata history
Up to 100 retained publisher events per page for 4e27010641c570831bcc9470f09e292cc2bfc880f9795f9d1a7dd19ef3f7f629. Withdrawals and unavailable references remain attributed to their publishers.
intelligence_src_d11443da85ea659d49
observed · 2026-10-12 15:37:04 UTC
In GCP's case, they introduced a modification to the Cloud SQL's PostgreSQL engine allowing the role assigned to the tenant (cloudsqlsuperuser) to arbitrarily change the ownership of a table to any user or role in the database. Thus, an attacker could (1) create a new table, (2) create an index function with a malicious payload, and (3) change the table owner to GCP’s superuser role (cloudsqladmin). Next, by initiating an ANALYZE command, the malicious function is executed with GCP’s superuser high privileges. Then, an attacker could gain local privilege escalation to root using a symlink attack, and finally, having gained CAP_NET_ADMIN and CAP_NET_RAW capabilities, escape their container via TCP injection of a fake configuration response from the metadata service containing an attacker-controlled SSH key (this is only possible due to the fact that communication with GCP's metadata service is unencrypted and unsigned). A similar bug existed in Azure Database for PostgreSQL, and was part of ExtraReplica's vulnerability chain.
Fingerprint: 0227ed35b8df9535af41a48b63850f88e2a7796d052aba26d3b9eee850e2ee26
intelligence_src_d11443da85ea659d49
observed · 2026-10-12 15:37:03 UTC
available
Fingerprint: 46fd50ac705e064c7517d97d61b5ec511c9b1ada6209622159dd39573ba08e5c