Attributed metadata history
Up to 100 retained publisher events per page for 5a5282a1b6d6f4b6cf9a82c72084ae9e9c5e092eeed85b83826a2642dfe205af. Withdrawals and unavailable references remain attributed to their publishers.
intelligence_src_e53adb99e40ae66258
observed · 2026-10-12 16:25:04 UTC
ePrint Report: Reverse-Bleichenbacher: Bleichenbacher Attacks are Practical Again Youheng Lü, Lorenz Hetterich, Riccardo Zanotto, Cas Cremers, Michael Schwarz, Lukas Gerlach Bleichenbacher's 1998 padding oracle attack against RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 has resurfaced repeatedly over the past decades, especially in TLS. Although modern browsers prefer TLS 1.3, many servers and clients still permit RSA key exchange for backward compatibility, enabling active network attackers to decrypt recorded sessions. Still, practical man-in-the-middle attacks remain challenging. The classical attack narrows the plaintext interval from the top down, spending many queries on secret-independent padding bytes before reaching the PreMasterSecret in the low-order 46 bytes of the RSA plaintext. As a result, prior attacks required multiple vulnerable servers in parallel to avoid connection timeouts. In this paper, we present Reverse-Bleichenbacher, a novel variant of the Bleichenbacher algorithm. In contrast to all previous Bleichenbacher-style algorithms, our algorithm recovers the least significant bytes first and terminates the searc
Fingerprint: dc2b1f8f165f3b2dacc1b916dd2ce466ddd393fe89e60768d14c205f7142b35d
intelligence_src_e53adb99e40ae66258
observed · 2026-10-12 16:25:03 UTC
available
Fingerprint: 366cb966e32414edc1db353849a1ee8d6b8462b83786e04001881ba6594765ad