Attributed metadata history
Up to 100 retained publisher events per page for 61f108ea12f0c4359a8d6e700f3dfde21ecd6c37756024848aadb54729280b63. Withdrawals and unavailable references remain attributed to their publishers.
intelligence_src_d11443da85ea659d49
observed · 2026-10-12 15:37:04 UTC
An attacker with `run.services.update` and `iam.serviceAccounts.actAs` permissions but without explicit registry access could deploy new revisions of Cloud Run services that pulled private container images stored in the same GCP project. This was possible because Cloud Run uses a service agent with the necessary registry read permissions to retrieve these images, regardless of the caller’s access level. By updating a service revision and injecting malicious commands into the container's arguments (e.g., using Netcat for reverse shell access), attackers could extract secrets or run unauthorized code. The flaw stemmed from the Cloud Run service agent’s trust model, which did not enforce a separate registry permission check on the deploying identity. Google has since modified this behavior to require that the identity updating the Cloud Run resource also has explicit Artifact Registry Reader or Storage Object Viewer roles.
Fingerprint: 0197b67329079bfe54211b37cd8f44b013af43ffb49bc3abdf6e5a5d9b3a367f
intelligence_src_d11443da85ea659d49
observed · 2026-10-12 15:37:03 UTC
available
Fingerprint: 46fd50ac705e064c7517d97d61b5ec511c9b1ada6209622159dd39573ba08e5c