Attributed metadata history
Up to 100 retained publisher events per page for 895eae5e21b27675330bd8b74f855b1c31e7e01be502fcced991e770376c3598. Withdrawals and unavailable references remain attributed to their publishers.
intelligence_src_e53adb99e40ae66258
observed · 2026-10-12 16:25:04 UTC
ePrint Report: Lifting Bounded-Collusion Security to Full Security in Pairing-Based Encryption Schemes Roy Stracovsky, Brent Waters, David J. Wu Notions like identity-based encryption (IBE) and attribute-based encryption (ABE) augment public-key encryption to provide fine-grained access control to encrypted data. In these settings, there is a single master public key that anyone can encrypt to. Users in turn possess different secret keys that determine which ciphertexts they can decrypt. The standard, or full, security notion for these schemes stipulates that a ciphertext computationally hides the message if the adversary does not possess a key that is allowed to decrypt. A relaxed notion of security that is often much easier to achieve is bounded-collusion security, where we only require security against adversaries that have an a priori bounded number of keys (and the scheme parameters can grow with this bound). For instance, it is known that vanilla public-key encryption implies bounded-collusion IBE (and ABE) whereas there is a black-box separation between public-key encryption and fully secure IBE. I
Fingerprint: 184f53625db3e11c34886ed66f1daa150cc60b742cd18614e59e91f8a6b1e48a
intelligence_src_e53adb99e40ae66258
observed · 2026-10-12 16:25:03 UTC
available
Fingerprint: 366cb966e32414edc1db353849a1ee8d6b8462b83786e04001881ba6594765ad