Attributed metadata history
Up to 100 retained publisher events per page for 9bf3fe64f7f839b4cc42bc71ea2e2e624bd7ee07bd2a5fe13aed7fcebae9edd2. Withdrawals and unavailable references remain attributed to their publishers.
intelligence_src_d11443da85ea659d49
observed · 2026-10-12 15:37:04 UTC
An information disclosure vulnerability in the Google Cloud Build service could have allowed an attacker to view sensitive logs if they had gained prior access to a GCP environment and had permission to create a new Cloud Build instance (cloudbuild.builds.create) or permission to directly impersonate the Cloud Build default service account (which is highly privileged by design and therefore considered to be a known privilege escalation vector in GCP). An attacker could then potentially use this information in order to better facilitate lateral movement, privilege escalation or a supply chain attack by other means. This issue was due to excessive permissions granted to the default service account created by Cloud Build, particularly access to audit logs containing all project permissions (logging.privateLogEntries.list).
Fingerprint: 74753490ae6cf5cbb52a3a93baff621dce35112aedde91f129c8f2bf66ea3d1e
intelligence_src_d11443da85ea659d49
observed · 2026-10-12 15:37:03 UTC
available
Fingerprint: 46fd50ac705e064c7517d97d61b5ec511c9b1ada6209622159dd39573ba08e5c