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Up to 100 retained publisher events per page for a0e9c7a3adfc277afa586a2f2799a5759ec634e563a31a870ce6bcc585c4df85. Withdrawals and unavailable references remain attributed to their publishers.
intelligence_src_ad89769b9e64591ab5
observed · 2026-10-12 14:01:03 UTC
available
Fingerprint: 05d146f940ea021a0ff67bda626eeffcdf1f2ccbc0f3c3114fff19b0a80eeaf4
intelligence_src_ad89769b9e64591ab5
observed · 2026-10-12 14:01:03 UTC
This is a guest post by a researcher who wants to remain anonymous. You can contact the author via email. Recently, John Tuckner of Secure Annex and Wladimir Palant published great research about how BIScience and its various brands collect user data. This inspired us to publish part of our ongoing research to help the extension ecosystem be safer from bad actors. This post details what BIScience does with the collected data and how their public disclosures are inconsistent with actual practices, based on evidence compiled over several years. Screenshot of claims on the BIScience website Contents Who is BIScience? BIScience collects data from millions of users BIScience buys data from partner third-party extensions BIScience receives raw data, not anonymized data Misleading CWS policies compliance BIScience extensions exception claims Partner extensions exception claims, guided by BIScience BIScience SDK Unnecessary features Misleading privacy policy disclosures Misleading user consent Our hope for the future
Fingerprint: 01063416499b9b5c6a4391f98819c5de3da0ea8ea07ce702992010565115a04c