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Up to 100 retained publisher events per page for a167934d12d367817358d15996fd7eaaf8892e16d0439c33c15414441537deff. Withdrawals and unavailable references remain attributed to their publishers.
intelligence_src_e53adb99e40ae66258
observed · 2026-10-13 04:25:05 UTC
ePrint Report: Witness-Succinct UC-Secure SNARKs with Weaker Trust Assumptions Nahid Roustaeifar, Maryam Zarezadeh, Neel Mehendale, Behzad Abdolmaleki, Mahshid Delavar, Stefan Köpsell Zero-knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments of Knowledge (zkSNARKs) are foundational cryptographic primitives enabling privacy-preserving and verifiable computation. However, most existing zkSNARK constructions rely on strong trust assumptions—typically a fully trusted setup—which undermines their applicability in adversarial or decentralized environments. Although transparent zkSNARKs remove this assumption, they typically do not satisfy strong composability guarantees such as Universal Composability (UC). In this work, we present the first framework for constructing UC-secure zkSNARKs under weaker trust assumptions, based on a new primitive called Key-Updatable Polynomial Commitments (KU-pCom). This primitive enables publicly verifiable commitment-key updates, requiring only one honest update rather than a fully trusted setup. Our compiler transforms any Simulation-Extractable zkSNARK into a UC-secure variant by
Fingerprint: 06914415ae0ee500247898f7a3c54a72455adc4e8d00910252d9add91789b948
intelligence_src_e53adb99e40ae66258
observed · 2026-10-12 16:25:03 UTC
available
Fingerprint: 366cb966e32414edc1db353849a1ee8d6b8462b83786e04001881ba6594765ad