Attributed metadata history
Up to 100 retained publisher events per page for b5e5fcfab766fbbaae6eef0ed7f75772d860a9e05c4f25401f70a880ea35ee40. Withdrawals and unavailable references remain attributed to their publishers.
intelligence_src_350d40f2cc69277bca
observed · 2026-10-12 08:34:02 UTC
available
Fingerprint: fe0fdc07a129ff203534388ab215df24d870069207d85287923a2a35a12b5578
intelligence_src_350d40f2cc69277bca
observed · 2026-10-12 08:34:02 UTC
Summary This is the first part of a blog series about reverse engineering and exploiting Samsung’s TrustZone. Following parts in the series so far: 2, 3. This first post covers the basics of the architecture. All of this is public info, nothing new, all of it has been covered in bits and pieces in various publications before. Some of it comes from Trustonic/Samsung materials, some of it from open source software, and some of it from the few great instances of prior research. It’s here as an intro, for completeness. Later in the series, I summarize the reverse engineering results and explain the vulnerabilities that I have found.
Fingerprint: 2b28833002ef5718dda75c2238237d2778879d7d80ca6ae6996a657010eb7cb6