Attributed metadata history
Up to 100 retained publisher events per page for cefcd25676db404b18365079c9ac0c26885a5cc76b9daad05551ac022efc48d4. Withdrawals and unavailable references remain attributed to their publishers.
intelligence_src_029e2f07006b78ebcb
observed · 2026-10-12 05:29:01 UTC
Written by: Kelli Vanderlee, Stuart Carrera For years, the cybersecurity industry's understanding of software supply chain compromise has been anchored by a few watershed events, including Russian cyber espionage actor ICE RELIC’s (formerly known as APT29) 2020 compromise of SolarWinds and North Korean cyber espionage actor UNC4736's 2023 compromise of 3CX. However, Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) has been tracking growth in threat activity targeting open source software repositories to conduct supply chain compromises over the past several years. A series of large scale open source software supply chain compromise campaigns in 2025 and the first half of 2026 underscore how important it is that organizations implement defensive strategies that directly address this threat vector. In this blog post, GTIG and Mandiant discuss trends we have observed in threat actor use of software supply chain compromise, and provide mitigation and hardening recommendations that incorporate insights we have developed as a result of supporting customers through recent campaigns in which threat actors manipulated open source packages. Open Source Supply Chain Compromise Grows in Volume a
Fingerprint: 8ea3652a8b4401eb2e88ac128b4c4d0828cbe1b5fb536b4a9625d01f9a4e2b1e
intelligence_src_029e2f07006b78ebcb
observed · 2026-10-12 05:29:01 UTC
available
Fingerprint: e71aa6d523741f9f527f5071fd96527dbb781bc01e36c89fd9ec28cdb29f734f