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DNS-PERSIST-01: A New Model for DNS-based Challenge Validation

When you request a certificate from Let’s Encrypt, our servers validate that you control the hostnames in that certificate using ACME challenges. For subscribers who need wildcard certificates or who prefer not to expose infrastructure to the public Internet, the DNS-01 challenge type has long been the only choice. DNS-01 works well. It is widely supported and battle-tested, but it comes with operational costs: DNS propagation delays, recurring DNS updates at renewal time, and automation that often requires distributing DNS credentials throughout your infrastructure. We are implementing support for a new ACME challenge type, DNS-PERSIST-01, based on a new IETF draft specification. As the name implies, it uses DNS as the validation mechanism, but replaces repeated demonstrations of control with a persistent authorization record bound to a specific ACME account and CA. The draft describes this method as being “particularly suited for environments where traditional challenge methods are impractical, such as IoT deployments, multi-tenant platforms, and scenarios requiring batch certificate operations”. DNS-01 Proves Control Repeatedly With DNS-01, validation relies on a one-time token generated by us. Your ACME client publishes a TXT record containing that token at _acme-challenge.<YOUR_DOMAIN>, and we query DNS to confirm that it matches the expected value. Because each authorization requires a new token, DNS updates become part of the issuance workflow. The benefit is that each successful validation provides fresh proof that you currently control DNS for the name being issued. In practice, this often means DNS API credentials live somewhere in your issuance pipeline, validation attempts involve waiting for DNS propagation, and DNS changes happen frequently — sometimes many times per day in large deployments. Many subscribers accept these tradeoffs, but others would prefer to keep DNS updates and sensitive credentials out of their issuance path. DNS-PERSIST-01 Authorizes Persistently DNS-PERSIST-01 approaches validation differently. Instead of publishing a new challenge record for each issuance, you publish a standing authorization in the form of a TXT record that identifies both the CA and the specific ACME account you authorize to issue for this domain. For the hostname example.com, the record would live at _validation-persist.example.com: _validation-persist.example.com. IN TXT ( "letsencrypt.org;" " accounturi=https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/acct/1234567890" ) Once this record exists, it can be reused for new issuance and all subsequent renewals. Operationally, this removes DNS changes from the critical path. Security and Operational Tradeoffs With DNS-01, the sensitive asset is DNS write access. In many deployments, DNS API credentials are distributed throughout issuance and renewal pipelines, increasing the number of places an attacker might compromise them. DNS-PERSIST-01 instead binds authorization directly to an ACME account, allowing DNS write access to remain more tightly controlled after initial setup. The tradeoff is that, because the authorization record persists over time, protecting the ACME account key becomes the central concern. Controlling Scope and Lifetime DNS-PERSIST-01 also introduces explicit scope controls. Without additional parameters, authorization applies only to the validated Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) and remains valid indefinitely. Wildcard Certificates Adding policy=wildcard broadens the authorization scope to include the validated FQDN, wildcard certificates such as *.example.com, and subdomains whose suffix matches the validated FQDN: _validation-persist.example.com. IN TXT ( "letsencrypt.org;" " accounturi=https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/acct/1234567890;" " policy=wildcard" ) Optional Expiration Subscribers who aren’t comfortable with authorization persisting indefinitely can include a

Reference details

Source category
research-report
First reported
Feb 18, 2026 00:00 UTC
Last reported
Feb 18, 2026 00:00 UTC
Catalog updated
Oct 15, 2026 02:37 UTC
Record ID
0f0060d6f1e84474f626b9973b6d648d3990b0ae5b2ac75e76b6e7d22d4c0f0a

Published indicators

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Source observations

intelligence_src_823f7b237762257237

Source-provided label
Publisher RSS metadata
Evidence class
mentioned in report
Confidence
Not reported
Observed
Feb 18, 2026 00:00 UTC
Retrieved
Oct 15, 2026 02:37 UTC

This record contains metadata and attribution only. It does not host, download, unpack, render, or execute malware samples.

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1 sources: 0 stale, 0 needing attention, 0 paused, 0 unverified.

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