src_fb50be84b835134c75
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- Observed
- Oct 07, 2026 04:00 UTC
- Retrieved
- Oct 08, 2026 03:43 UTC
arXiv:2610.07759v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Byzantine quorum safety relies on correct replicas refusing to sign conflicting values. A replica that loses its protocol state during recovery but retains its identity and signing key may forget an earlier vote. We study certificates formed by matching signed votes from at least $q$ of $n$ replicas, assuming that each correct replica avoids confli
When Can Stateless Recovery Defeat Byzantine Quorum Safety? A Tight Normal Form for Single-Step BFT2e099f03bc3ecf279f3173408d4c68eedbd3c5806701d14b5becd4d822b22e4dNetwork indicators are visibly defanged. This page does not make them clickable or send them to another service.
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