intelligence_src_c25d91fa3ad9ae9ac7
- Source-provided label
- Publisher RSS metadata
- Evidence class
- mentioned in report
- Confidence
- Not reported
- Observed
- Aug 14, 2025 01:20 UTC
- Retrieved
- Oct 14, 2026 02:57 UTC
This post explores data exfiltration attacks in Google Jules, an asynchronous coding agent. This is the first of three posts that will highlight my research on Google Jules in May 2025. All information provided was also shared with Google at that time. This first post will focus on data exfiltration, the lethal trifecta. But let’s first talk about Jules’ system prompt. Jules’ System Prompt and Multiple Agents To grab the system prompt I just asked it to write it into a file.
426860693e4668979557e595e6e7fbec4b8aab4190dcb7a7ab03e79f9f8af811Network indicators are visibly defanged. This page does not make them clickable or send them to another service.
No validated file hashes or network indicators are stored for this record.
This record contains metadata and attribution only. It does not host, download, unpack, render, or execute malware samples.
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1 sources: 0 stale, 0 needing attention, 0 paused, 0 unverified.
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