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Magnetar: High-speed post-quantum RV64 zkVM from standard hashes

ePrint Report: Magnetar: High-speed post-quantum RV64 zkVM from standard hashes Srinath Setty We describe the design, implementation, and experimental evaluation of Magnetar, a transparent proof system for RV64I program executions (i.e., a zkVM). Magnetar is the first zkVM to simultaneously satisfy the following three properties: 1. General-purpose proving. Magnetar proves programs compiled to the general-purpose RV64I ISA. An implementation of the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) written in Rust or Go can therefore run inside Magnetar, yielding a zkEVM for proving executions of existing EVM smart contracts. 2. Hash-based, post-quantum security. Magnetar’s cryptographic security is rooted in standard hash functions (e.g., SHA-256 or SHA-3). 3. Efficient recursion. Magnetar’s verification work is dominated by evaluating standard hash functions. Magnetar’s proof engine, BinarySpartan, is well-suited for such bit-oriented computations, so verifying a proof is itself an efficient proving workload. Unlike prior general-purpose zkVMs, Magnetar does not rely on circuit-friendly algebraic hash functions such as Poseidon or Poseidon2, elliptic-curve or lattice assumptions, or a conjectured Reed–Solomon proximity gap. Even prior zkVMs commonly described as hash-based rely on elliptic-curve or lattice assumptions in their core proving machinery, provide only about 100 bits of security, or rest on conjectured soundness; some do more than one of these. Finally, we implement Magnetar in Rust and experimentally evaluate it. We find that, at 120 bits of provable security and with 12 performance cores on an M4 Max MacBook Pro, Magnetar proves 222-cycle executions at 6.5–7.7 million cycles per second, with proofs of about 600 KiB that verify in 10–12 ms. Across 15 application workloads, Magnetar’s proving throughput is 22–57× that of SP1 Hypercube, a hash-and-more-based zkVM; 10–33× that of Jolt-Dory, a curve-based zkVM; and 5–18× that of Jolt-Akita, a lattice-based zkVM, with geometric-mean speedups of about 35×, 16×, and 8.5×, respectively. Magnetar’s proofs are about 4.6× smaller than SP1 Hypercube’s; Jolt’s proofs are under 100 KiB, but they rely on elliptic-curve or lattice assumptions.

Reference details

Source category
research-report
First reported
Oct 12, 2026 17:36 UTC
Last reported
Oct 12, 2026 17:36 UTC
Catalog updated
Oct 13, 2026 04:25 UTC
Record ID
78e789fff6bb2577696da85c15876eed6fa19d7921f285542082499753a465e8

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intelligence_src_e53adb99e40ae66258

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Evidence class
mentioned in report
Confidence
Not reported
Observed
Oct 12, 2026 17:36 UTC
Retrieved
Oct 13, 2026 04:25 UTC

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