src_c25d91fa3ad9ae9ac7
- Source-provided label
- Not reported
- Evidence class
- mentioned in report
- Confidence
- Not reported
- Observed
- Jan 15, 2024 07:00 UTC
- Retrieved
- Oct 08, 2026 03:44 UTC
A few days ago Riley Goodside posted about an interesting discovery on how an LLM prompt injection can happen via invisible instructions in pasted text. This works by using a special set of Unicode code points from the Tags Unicode Block. The proof-of-concept showed how a simple text contained invisible instructions that caused ChatGPT to invoke DALL-E to create an image. Hidden Instructions for L
ASCII Smuggler Tool: Crafting Invisible Text and Decoding Hidden Codes804916134d51b554f72b31f652b9824dc49bb8fa09418a6eb58251c3aa084dfeNetwork indicators are visibly defanged. This page does not make them clickable or send them to another service.
No validated file hashes or network indicators are stored for this record.
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1 sources: 0 stale, 0 needing attention, 0 paused, 1 unverified.
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