intelligence_src_d11443da85ea659d49
- Source-provided label
- Publisher RSS metadata
- Evidence class
- mentioned in report
- Confidence
- Not reported
- Observed
- Jul 20, 2022 00:00 UTC
- Retrieved
- Oct 14, 2026 03:41 UTC
If a malicious actor with prior access to an AWS environment has permission to modify the S3 Replication Service role access policy, they could abuse cross-account replication to exfiltrate stolen data to an external bucket under their control. Moreover, when configured to replicate to multiple buckets at once, and if logging is only scoped to specific buckets (as opposed to being set to log "all current and future buckets"), then the S3 Replication Service only logs a putObject event to CloudTrail for the first destination bucket. Thus, as long as the malicious actor's bucket isn't the first replication destination, their activity wouldn't be logged in CloudTrail, and might go undetected.
99c6bb611a9caeb8e2106e10bee2a34e3660aab7ad3ebfe97428700a63fc785eNetwork indicators are visibly defanged. This page does not make them clickable or send them to another service.
No validated file hashes or network indicators are stored for this record.
This record contains metadata and attribution only. It does not host, download, unpack, render, or execute malware samples.
Sources represented on this page. Publication and observation dates describe the content; successful batch dates describe local collection. A recent batch does not certify complete coverage or current provider availability.
1 sources: 0 stale, 0 needing attention, 0 paused, 0 unverified.
Stale means older than twice the recorded collection interval, with a minimum of one hour; without an interval, the threshold is 24 hours. Cached content remains available while a feed is stale, paused, or unverified.