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REPORTPUBLIC METADATA

Deploying Let's Encrypt's New Issuance Chains

On Thursday, June 6th, 2024, we will be switching issuance to use our new intermediate certificates. Simultaneously, we are removing the DST Root CA X3 cross-sign from our API, aligning with our strategy to shorten the Let’s Encrypt chain of trust. We will begin issuing ECDSA end-entity certificates from a default chain that just contains a single ECDSA intermediate, removing a second intermediate and the option to issue an ECDSA end-entity certificate from an RSA intermediate. The Let’s Encrypt staging environment will make an equivalent change on April 24th, 2024. Most Let’s Encrypt Subscribers will not need to take any action in response to this change because ACME clients, like certbot, will automatically configure the new intermediates when certificates are renewed. The Subscribers who will be affected are those who currently pin intermediate certificates (more on that later). The following diagram depicts what the new hierarchy looks like. You can see details of all of the certificates on our updated Chain of Trust documentation page. New Intermediate Certificates Earlier this year, Let’s Encrypt generated new intermediate keys and certificates. They will replace the current intermediates, which were issued in September 2020 and are approaching their expiration. All certificates - issued by both RSA and ECDSA intermediates - will be served with a default chain of ISRG Root X1 → (RSA or ECDSA) Intermediate → End-Entity Certificate. That is, all certificates, regardless of whether you choose to have an RSA or ECDSA end-entity certificate, will have one intermediate which is directly signed by the ISRG Root X1, which is Let’s Encrypt’s most widely trusted root. The new ECDSA intermediates will also have an alternate chain to ISRG Root X2: ISRG Root X2 → ECDSA Intermediate → End-Entity Certificate. This is only applicable to a small number of Subscribers who prefer the smallest TLS handshake possible. To use this ECDSA-only chain, see your ACME client’s documentation on how to request alternate chains. There will not be any alternative chains for the RSA intermediates. It is important to note that there will now be multiple active RSA and two active ECDSA intermediates at the same time. An RSA leaf certificate may be signed by any of the active RSA intermediates (a value from “R10” to “R14” in the issuer common name field of your certificate), and an ECDSA leaf certificate may be signed by any of the active ECDSA intermediates (“E5” through “E9”). Again, your ACME client should handle this automatically. A Certificate Authority’s intermediate certificates expire every few years and need to be replaced, just like a website’s certificate is routinely renewed. Going forward, Let’s Encrypt intends to switch what intermediates are in use annually, which will help enhance the overall security of the certificates. Removing DST Root CA X3 Cross-sign The new intermediate chains will not include the DST Root CA X3 cross-sign, as previously announced in our post about Shortening the Let’s Encrypt Chain of Trust. By eliminating the cross-sign, we’re making our certificates leaner and more efficient, leading to faster page loads for Internet users. We already stopped providing the cross-sign in the default certificate chain on February 8th, 2024, so if your ACME client is not explicitly requesting the chain with DST Root CA X3, this will not be a change for you. ECDSA Intermediates as Default for ECDSA Certificates Currently, ECDSA end-entity certificates are signed by our RSA intermediates unless users opted in via a request form to use our ECDSA intermediates. With our new intermediates, we will begin issuing all ECDSA end-entity certificates from the ECDSA intermediates. The request form and allow-list will no longer be used, which we had introduced to make ECDSA intermediates available. Earlier, the default

Reference details

Source category
research-report
First reported
Apr 12, 2024 00:00 UTC
Last reported
Apr 12, 2024 00:00 UTC
Catalog updated
Oct 14, 2026 00:12 UTC
Record ID
9fe9b063b1b51ddea205d0a3f4078ded5ceff202eebfae875ed45afc35832406

Published indicators

Network indicators are visibly defanged. This page does not make them clickable or send them to another service.

No validated file hashes or network indicators are stored for this record.

Source observations

intelligence_src_823f7b237762257237

Source-provided label
Publisher RSS metadata
Evidence class
mentioned in report
Confidence
Not reported
Observed
Apr 12, 2024 00:00 UTC
Retrieved
Oct 14, 2026 00:12 UTC

This record contains metadata and attribution only. It does not host, download, unpack, render, or execute malware samples.

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1 sources: 0 stale, 0 needing attention, 0 paused, 0 unverified.

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