src_350d40f2cc69277bca
- Source-provided label
- Not reported
- Evidence class
- mentioned in report
- Confidence
- Not reported
- Observed
- Aug 19, 2021 00:00 UTC
- Retrieved
- Oct 08, 2026 03:51 UTC
Summary During the regular boot sequence, Huawei’s BootROM initializes the UFS hardware and the crypto engine in order to load and verify the next stage bootloader image from flash. However, when run in download mode, which maybe used for factory flashing and repair purposes, a connected host can communicate with the BootROM via USB over a serial communication channel. The basis of the communicati
CVE-2021-22434: Huawei Arbitrary Write in BootROM USB Stackbc47a030e7c83842412297c567168b36cba529bcd8f9dc6a5e707894319b1515Network indicators are visibly defanged. This page does not make them clickable or send them to another service.
No validated file hashes or network indicators are stored for this record.
This record contains metadata and attribution only. It does not host, download, unpack, render, or execute malware samples.
Sources represented on this page. Publication and observation dates describe the content; successful batch dates describe local collection. A recent batch does not certify complete coverage or current provider availability.
1 sources: 0 stale, 0 needing attention, 0 paused, 1 unverified.
Stale means older than twice the recorded collection interval, with a minimum of one hour; without an interval, the threshold is 24 hours. Cached content remains available while a feed is stale, paused, or unverified.