src_c25d91fa3ad9ae9ac7
- Source-provided label
- Not reported
- Evidence class
- mentioned in report
- Confidence
- Not reported
- Observed
- Aug 01, 2025 15:00 UTC
- Retrieved
- Oct 08, 2026 03:44 UTC
In this post we demonstrate how a bypass in OpenAI’s “safe URL” rendering feature allows ChatGPT to send personal information to a third-party server. This can be exploited by an adversary via a prompt injection via untrusted data. If you process untrusted content, like summarizing a website, or analyze a pdf document, the author of that document can exfiltrate any information present in the promp
Exfiltrating Your ChatGPT Chat History and Memories With Prompt Injectionc61c9e7bd2d455a97415b0d67d23955154c5a60782397d451892a230cdae5432Network indicators are visibly defanged. This page does not make them clickable or send them to another service.
No validated file hashes or network indicators are stored for this record.
This record contains metadata and attribution only. It does not host, download, unpack, render, or execute malware samples.
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1 sources: 0 stale, 0 needing attention, 0 paused, 1 unverified.
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