Attributed metadata history

CloudFormation resource provider credentials leak

CloudFormation allows the use of Lambda-backed resource providers, wherein Lambda can be used to write custom provisioning logic to be executed during CloudFormation stack operations. The aforementioned Lambda functions were executed in an AWS-managed account (thus effectively allowing arbitrary code execution in that account), and were passed a set of credentials ("platformCredentials") for a role in this account that had several EventBridge permissions. These were sufficient for an attacker to create new rules in the AWS-managed account that leaked credentials belonging to other users of resource providers. For example, creating a rule that matched events with {"detail-type": ["AWS API Call via CloudTrail"]} exposed records of other tenants' API calls, which included copies of credentials for roles in other tenants' accounts.

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