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2,400+ MATCHING RECORDSMETADATA ONLY / SOURCE ATTRIBUTION PRESERVED
Threshold signature schemes, a form of multi-party computation (MPC) that lets a set of parties sign together without any one of them holding the key, are increasingly deployed inside trusted execution environments (TEEs). The combination is intended to amplify security for sensitive computations: MPC distributes trust across multiple independent parties, while TEEs root trust in the hardware manu
First reported Sep 25, 2026 11:00 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 08, 2026 03:53 UTCOpen evidence record
1Password’s FLAWED report, published on August 6, 2026, gives defenders a misleading picture of AI patching. Its headline says models produced clean fixes only 26% of the time. That figure includes experiments that deliberately instructed agents to apply the wrong fix, along with experiments in which agents could not compile or test their patches. The report risks making defenders less effective b
First reported Sep 15, 2026 11:00 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 08, 2026 03:53 UTCOpen evidence record
Security firms have published numerous blog posts describing how they pointed their agent harness at a codebase and found dozens of bugs (we’re one of them). However, these posts tend to focus on agentic code review, which is just one aspect of how we use AI in our security reviews. We want to give a different perspective: before code review even starts, agents now allow us to build custom tooling
First reported Sep 18, 2026 11:00 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 08, 2026 03:53 UTCOpen evidence record
We found and reported a bug in Provenance Blockchain, a public proof-of-stake chain built on Cosmos SDK, that lets any user grant themselves admin control over marker accounts without holding a single token. Provenance covers a range of financial services, including on-chain tokenized loans, private equity tokens, bridged assets, and asset registries. Our bug affected 82 markers representing live
First reported Aug 25, 2026 11:00 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 08, 2026 03:53 UTCOpen evidence record
Post-quantum cryptography is now one pip-install away for the entire Python ecosystem. With funding from the Sovereign Tech Agency, we implemented support for ML-KEM, the NIST-standard key-establishment primitive, and ML-DSA, the NIST-standard digital-signature primitive, in pyca/cryptography. On June 22, 2026, the White House ordered the U.S. government to accelerate its transition to post-quantu
First reported Jun 30, 2026 11:00 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 08, 2026 03:53 UTCOpen evidence record
Nitro Enclaves and Key Management Service (KMS) feel like a natural fit: since the KMS can verify attestation documents generated by the enclaves, developers can offload key management tasks from their applications to the AWS-managed service. But integrating an external service with your trusted enclaves comes with new threats, even if that service comes from the same provider. In this blog post—t
First reported Aug 05, 2026 11:00 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 08, 2026 03:53 UTCOpen evidence record
Every Signal chat starts the same way: the client asks the Signal server for the public key associated with your contact’s phone number. But how do you know the server gave you the right key? A compromised server could provide a false public key, allowing the client to encrypt messages to an attacker rather than the intended recipient. Until now, the only way to detect such malfeasance was to veri
First reported Aug 11, 2026 17:30 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 08, 2026 03:53 UTCOpen evidence record
In April we released Mewt, our open-source mutation-testing engine that finds the gaps in your test suite. Today we’re expanding it with support for DAML, the language Canton Network applications are written in. Mewt now reads DAML, generates several classes of mutants (including two built for DAML’s authorization primitives), and runs them through your existing test suite to count how many mutant
First reported Jul 08, 2026 11:00 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 08, 2026 03:53 UTCOpen evidence record
Fermat famously claimed to have a “truly marvelous proof” of his Last Theorem, but he never wrote it down, insisting the margin of his page was too narrow to contain it. A few centuries later, Anthropic announced a complete formalization of Fermat’s Last Theorem using 13 million lines of Lean code (clearly not what Fermat intended). Luckily, we found a wonderfully cursed Lean bug, shown below, tha
First reported Sep 09, 2026 11:00 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 08, 2026 03:53 UTCOpen evidence record
As part of Patch the Planet, we received preview access to GPT 5.6-Cyber with a simple task: evaluate its cyber capabilities. Recent events inspired me to give it a challenge to work through: escape the VM I’d normally use for sandboxing. The target was a QEMU/KVM VM on my Linux dev machine (Debian Linux 12, AMD Zen3). It escaped the VM three different times. First, it used recently disclosed bugs
First reported Aug 26, 2026 11:00 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 08, 2026 03:53 UTCOpen evidence record
What happens when you clear dozens of Trail of Bits engineers’ schedules, pair them with every open-source maintainer they can contact, and unleash the latest frontier models like GPT-5.5-Cyber on critical open-source targets? Thanks to our partnership with OpenAI and its Daybreak initiative, we can report that the impact is hundreds of discovered bugs, 64 pull requests, and 51 issues filed across
First reported Jun 22, 2026 16:50 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 08, 2026 03:53 UTCOpen evidence record
Uniswap v4 hooks let developers add custom behavior to pools, including dynamic fees, custom accounting, and external integrations. This flexibility moves some security responsibilities into application and hook code. The Cork and Bunni exploits are two app-level incidents that show what can go wrong in that code. Together, they account for more than $20M in losses. Neither incident stemmed from a
First reported Jul 30, 2026 11:00 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 08, 2026 03:53 UTCOpen evidence record
Public skill marketplaces are being flooded with malicious skills that steal credentials, exfiltrate data, and hijack agents. In response, a segment of the security industry released skill scanners, a new family of tools designed to detect malicious skills before they’re installed. But we tested them, and they don’t work. We recently bypassed ClawHub’s malicious skill detector, Cisco’s agent skill
First reported Jun 03, 2026 11:00 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 08, 2026 03:53 UTCOpen evidence record
We’ve added a new chapter to our Testing Handbook: a comprehensive guide to security testing Rust programs. This chapter covers the tools and techniques we use at Trail of Bits to validate the security of Rust programs and systems. fn main() {(|f:&dyn Fn(u128)->Box< dyn Iterator+'static>|f(*[&( 0x7B736D70683F73u1288) ).take_while(|&n|n>0).map(|n|((n as u8)^0x1F)as char))as _)))} What’s in the chap
First reported Jul 13, 2026 11:00 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 08, 2026 03:53 UTCOpen evidence record
First reported Oct 02, 2026 11:00 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 08, 2026 03:53 UTCOpen evidence record
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