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Published file metadata, source observations, indicators, and research history in one bounded catalog.

2,400+Reachable catalog records
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Sources represented on this page. Publication and observation dates describe the content; successful batch dates describe local collection. A recent batch does not certify complete coverage or current provider availability.

2 sources: 0 stale, 0 needing attention, 0 paused, 2 unverified.

Review source update dates and status
  • src_029e2f07006b78ebcbCollection status unverifiedLast successful batch: Unverified
  • src_1e525cc24bd4c654beCollection status unverifiedLast successful batch: Unverified

Stale means older than twice the recorded collection interval, with a minimum of one hour; without an interval, the threshold is 24 hours. Cached content remains available while a feed is stale, paused, or unverified.

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2,400+ MATCHING RECORDSMETADATA ONLY / SOURCE ATTRIBUTION PRESERVED
REPORT1 SOURCE

The ‘Ghost’ in the Database: Recovering Active ADFS Signing Keys via Machine DPAPI

Written by: Shebin Mathew Introduction The "Golden SAML" technique, first described by CyberArk researchers in 2017, and further detailed by Mandiant researchers in 2021, remains one of the most effective methods for threat actors to forge identity assertions in the Microsoft ecosystem. By obtaining the private key of an ADFS token-signing certificate, an attacker can authenticate as any user to a

First reported Jul 07, 2026 14:00 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 08, 2026 03:56 UTCOpen evidence record
REPORT1 SOURCE

Google’s Continued Disruption of Malicious Residential Proxy Networks

Background Today, in coordination with the FBI, Lumen, and others, Google took action against the NetNut residential proxy network, also known as Popa. This action builds on our disruption of the IPIDEA proxy network that took place in January 2026, and is a continuation of Google’s objective to dismantle malicious residential proxy networks. Actions Taken As a part of this disruption we took the

First reported Jul 02, 2026 14:00 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 08, 2026 03:56 UTCOpen evidence record
REPORT1 SOURCE

ZDI-CAN-32917: Autodesk

A CVSS score 7.8 AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H severity vulnerability discovered by 'ub1cu0' was reported to the affected vendor on: 2026-09-03, 34 days ago. The vendor is given until 2027-01-01 to publish a fix or workaround. Once the vendor has created and tested a patch we will coordinate the release of a public advisory.

First reported Sep 03, 2026 05:00 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 08, 2026 03:55 UTCOpen evidence record

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A filename, label, or report mention alone does not establish maliciousness. Observation dates describe cited sources; collection dates describe this local metadata catalog. No malware samples are stored, fetched, or executed by these pages.