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2,400+ MATCHING RECORDSMETADATA ONLY / SOURCE ATTRIBUTION PRESERVED
Security testing and exposure management have run on separate tracks for years, leaving a blind spot between what a scanner flags and what an attacker can exploit. Synack's new integration with Wiz closes that disconnect, feeding continuously validated pentest findings directly into Wiz's exposure management view. The post Unifying Security Testing and Exposure Management: Introducing the Synack and Wiz Integration appeared first on Synack.
First reported Sep 23, 2026 18:37 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 17, 2026 02:53 UTCOpen evidence record
A year since launching Synack’s integration with Qualys, the partnership now includes broader platform support, more AI-led testing, and a shared presence at Qualys ROCon Americas 2026. The post Turn Scanner Findings into Validated Risk with Synack and Qualys appeared first on Synack.
First reported Oct 05, 2026 09:28 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 17, 2026 02:53 UTCOpen evidence record
In September, hackers from a group called ShinyHunters announced that they stole a trove of FBI data about its own agents. It was an intelligence disaster. Last week, the FBI arrested (alternate link) someone associated with that crime.
First reported Oct 12, 2026 15:01 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 17, 2026 02:51 UTCOpen evidence record
Matthew Green has a new site that tries to estimate the number of cryptanalyst-hours that have been spent analyzing different public-key algorithms: Abstract: We estimate how much public cryptanalysis each public-key assumption has received, using the literature itself as the instrument. From roughly sixteen thousand candidate papers we classify cryptanalytic work on ECDLP, structured and plain lattices, syndrome decoding and their comparators, then convert papers into estimated research-allocation years through a person-level author map. These publication-based estimates may substantially overstate actual time spent. Lattices have overtaken elliptic curves in this cumulative measure only recently; we express that history as inference budgets under stated productivity assumptions. The study was conducted by AI models: Claude Fable 5.1 and Claude Opus 5.5 built the pipeline, ran the analysis and wrote this page, with contributions from GPT-6 Astra. Matthew Green set the questions, made the key methodological decisions and oversaw the work...
First reported Oct 15, 2026 16:24 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 17, 2026 02:51 UTCOpen evidence record
This essay was written with Seva Gunitsky, and originally appeared in Foreign Affairs. Two weeks after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in March 2022, the Russian TV Channel One editor Marina Ovsyannikova burst onto the set of the evening newscast. She held up a hand-drawn sign behind the anchor’s head that read: “Stop the war. Don’t believe propaganda. They’re lying to you!” She shouted, “No to war!” until she was dragged away. No one has protested the war on Russian television since then, partly as a result of tighter security and a general climate of fear. But in October 2024, Margarita Simonyan, one of Russia’s chief propagandists, gave another explanation. A growing number of the RT network’s anchors, she explained to an interviewer, are not real. “That face doesn’t exist. We generated the voice and everything else.” They were, she meant, produced by artificial intelligence. In a follow-up interview with the newspaper ...
First reported Oct 08, 2026 11:07 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 17, 2026 02:51 UTCOpen evidence record
Matthew Green has been writing a rather pessimistic series of posts about the potential for AI systems to vastly outperform humans in cryptanalysis of both symmetric and public-key ciphers. I am more optimistic than he is. That is, I have stronger faith in the over-engineering cryptographers tend to do. I am trying to write this up in more detail.
First reported Oct 14, 2026 14:24 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 17, 2026 02:51 UTCOpen evidence record
Apple just released a system called “Reference Image.” It can verify the image is exactly as taken by an iPhone—new models only—without tying it to a specific iPhone or photographer. It can also verify that multiple images came from the same iPhone. Other industry solutions require a photographer or institution to vouch for an image using their own credentials. We are concerned this puts some photographers, such as those operating in conflict zones, in a difficult position; it should not be necessary to forgo anonymity in order to prove image authenticity. We built Apple Reference Image to avoid using an explicit, public credential for photographers, and to avoid even implicit public association between different photos taken by the same sensor. The final reference image is instead signed by Apple’s signing service, after validation by PCC. That signature is backed by Apple’s strongest technical guarantees...
First reported Oct 07, 2026 11:07 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 17, 2026 02:51 UTCOpen evidence record
New research shows that squid lived all around the globe even before the Cretaceous-Paleogene mass extinction event. As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered. Blog moderation policy.
First reported Oct 16, 2026 21:06 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 17, 2026 02:51 UTCOpen evidence record
On Wednesday I spent a day fishing, on a small boat out of Gloucester, MA. We caught many cod (none of which we could keep), and a bunch of hake and mackerel (all of which we could keep). And…I caught a squid! Near as I can tell, it’s a longfin squid, sometimes called a Boston squid (Doryteuthis (Amerigo) pealeii). That night I cooked it over a barbecue grill—hot and fast. Delicious.
First reported Oct 09, 2026 20:24 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 17, 2026 02:51 UTCOpen evidence record
Another IoT cyberattack, this one in France: Hackers gained control of the software that regulates the temperatures of the refrigeration units, forcing some to warm to 50C (120F) overnight, according to one supermarket chain affected. […] Normally, supermarket freezers go through a short period of defrosting overnight, in which temperatures rise slightly. But the hackers ordered the units to heat up and stay hot, although Danfoss did not confirm any reports about just how warm the fridges and freezers could become in that process. Danfoss said the affected cold units were older models whose security software could not be updated to ward off a risk they had identified...
First reported Oct 14, 2026 14:10 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 17, 2026 02:51 UTCOpen evidence record
This is a current list of where and when I am scheduled to speak: I’m speaking at ATTENTION: Democracy, Rebuilt in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. The event runs October 21–23, 2026, and my talk is on Wednesday, October 21. I’m speaking at the University of Toronto in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, at 5 PM ET on October 22, 2026. I’m speaking at [un]prompted in San Francisco, California. The event runs October 27–29, 2026, and my talk is at 11:35 AM PT on Thursday, October 29. I’m speaking at the Catalyst Summit in Brampton, Ontario, Canada, on Wednesday, November 18, 2026...
First reported Oct 14, 2026 16:02 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 17, 2026 02:51 UTCOpen evidence record
This is a problem: Any open model whose weights have been edited can carry a backdoor, whether it’s a task-specific fine-tune, a merged adapter or an abliterated build. We have abliterated models in the title because it’s the most popular reason people download modified weights without verifying what’s inside. Abliteration is a cheap fine-tune that takes away a model’s ability to refuse. You find the direction in the weights that carries “no” and subtract it. The model then answers things a safety-tuned version would turn down. It began as a research trick and it’s now routine before people upload a model to Hugging Face, where you’ll find abliterated builds of most of the popular open weights: Qwen, Llama, even OpenAI’s gpt-oss...
First reported Oct 16, 2026 11:04 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 17, 2026 02:51 UTCOpen evidence record
Added Features Include Ubuntu 26.04 "resolute" in distro codenames [#3397 @anchore-oss-update-bot] source RPM filtering on Hummingbird [#3410 @willmurphyscode] Bug Fixes use relatedVulnerabilities description as fallback in SARIF output [#3271 @axidex] improve platform CPE determination logic [#3470 @westonsteimel] normalize uppercase V in semantic version comparison [#3461 @immanuwell] purl handling in cgr maven libs [#3420 @willmurphyscode] Treat uppercase V prefixes the same as lowercase v prefixes in fuzzy version comparison [#3037 #3089 @wasup-yash] Add Runtime Warnings When TLS Verification Is Disabled or HTTP Is Enabled [#3101 #3396 @Dashtid] Add support for the aarch64 architecture when parsing the version of Ruby gems in lockfiles [#3442 #3475 @msnandhis] zsh completion fails [#2933 #3433 @brandtkeller] (Full Changelog)
First reported Jun 03, 2026 14:19 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 17, 2026 02:49 UTCOpen evidence record
Added Features Add ability to scan zarf packages [#3329 #3366 @brandtkeller] Additional Changes respect withdrawn status of Go Vuln DB OSV records [#3495 @willmurphyscode] Govulndb OSV transformer [#3485 @willmurphyscode] (Full Changelog)
First reported Jun 05, 2026 16:17 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 17, 2026 02:49 UTCOpen evidence record
On a normal day Let’s Encrypt issues nearly two million certificates. When we think about what essential infrastructure for the Internet needs to be prepared for though, we’re not thinking about normal days. We want to be prepared to respond as best we can to the most difficult situations that might arise. In some of the worst scenarios, we might want to re-issue all of our certificates in a 24 hour period in order to avoid widespread disruptions. That means being prepared to issue 200 million certificates in a day, something no publicly trusted CA has ever done. We recently completed most of the work and investments needed to issue 200 million certificates in a day and we thought we’d let people know what was involved. All of this was made possible by our sponsors and funders, including major hardware contributions from Cisco, Thales, and Fortinet. Scenarios Security and compliance events are a certainty in our industry. We obviously try to minimize them, but since we anticipate they will happen, we spend a lot of time preparing to respond in the best ways possible. In February of 2020 a bug affecting our compliance caused us to need to revoke and replace three million active certificates. That was approximately 2.6% of all active certificates. What if that bug had affected all of our certificates? That’s more than 150 million certificates covering more than 240 million domains. What if it had also been a more serious bug, requiring us to revoke and replace all certificates within 24 hours? That’s the kind of worst case scenario we need to be prepared for. To make matters worse, during an incident it takes some time to evaluate the problem and make decisions, so we would be starting revocation and reissuance somewhat after the beginning of the 24-hour clock. That means we would actually have less time once the momentous decision has been made to revoke and replace 150 million or more certificates. Infrastructure Improvements After reviewing our systems, we determined that there were four primary bottlenecks that would prevent us from replacing 200 million certificates in a day. Database performance, internal networking speed, cryptographic signing module (HSM) performance, and bandwidth. Database Performance Let’s Encrypt has a primary certificate authority database at the heart of the service we offer. This tracks the status of certificate issuance and the associated accounts. It is write heavy, with plenty of reads as well. At any given time a single database server is the writer, with some reads directed at identical machines with replicas. The single writer non-clustered strategy helps with consistency and reduces complexity, but it means that writes and some reads must operate within the performance constraints of a single machine. Our previous generation of database servers had dual Intel Xeon E5-2650 v4 CPUs, 24 physical cores in total. They had 1TB memory with 24 3.8TB SSDs connected via SATA in a RAID 10 configuration. These worked fine for daily issuance but would not be able to handle replacing all of our certificates in a single day. We have replaced them with a new generation of database server from Dell featuring dual AMD EPYC 7542 CPUs, 64 physical cores in total. These machines have 2TB of faster RAM. Much faster CPUs and double the memory is great, but the really interesting thing about these machines is that the EPYC CPUs provide 128 PCIe4 lanes each. This means we could pack in 24 6.4TB NVME drives for massive I/O performance. There is no viable hardware RAID for NVME, so we’ve switched to ZFS to provide the data protection we need. Internal Networking Let’s Encrypt infrastructure was originally built with 1G copper networking. Between bonding multiple connections for 2G performance, and use of the very limited number of 10G ports available on our switches, it served us pretty well until 2020. By 2020 the volume of data we were moving around internally was too much to handle efficiently with
First reported Feb 10, 2021 00:00 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 17, 2026 02:46 UTCOpen evidence record
It’s hard to believe 10 years have passed since Eric Rescorla, Alex Halderman, Peter Eckersley and I founded ISRG as a nonprofit home for public benefit digital infrastructure. We had an ambitious vision, but we couldn’t have known then the extent to which that vision would become shared and leveraged by so much of the Internet. Since its founding in 2013, ISRG’s Let’s Encrypt certificate authority has come to serve hundreds of millions of websites and protect just about everyone who uses the Web. Our Prossimo project has brought the urgent issue of memory safety to the fore, and Divvi Up is set to revolutionize the way apps collect metrics while preserving user privacy. I’ve tried to comprehend how much data about people’s lives our work has and will protect, and tried even harder to comprehend what that means if one could quantify privacy. It’s simply beyond my ability. Some of the highlights from the past ten years include: May 24, 2013: ISRG is incorporated, intending to build Let’s Encrypt November 18, 2014: The Let’s Encrypt project is announced publicly September 14, 2015: Let’s Encrypt issues its first certificate October 19, 2015: Let’s Encrypt becomes publicly trusted December 3, 2015: Let’s Encrypt becomes generally available March 8, 2016: Let’s Encrypt issues its millionth certificate June 28, 2017: Let’s Encrypt issues its 100 millionth certificate March 11, 2019: The ACME protocol becomes an IETF standard February 27, 2020: Let’s Encrypt issues its billionth certificate October 26, 2020: ISRG board approves a privacy preserving metrics project, now Divvi Up December 9, 2020: ISRG board approves a memory safety project, now Prossimo December 18, 2020: Divvi Up starts servicing COVID exposure notification October 3, 2022: Support for Rust is merged into the Linux kernel All this wouldn’t be possible without our staff, community, donors, funders, and other partners, all of whom I’d like to thank wholeheartedly. I feel so fortunate that we’ve been able to thrive. We’re fortunate primarily because great people got involved and funders stepped up, but there’s also just a bit of good fortune involved in any success story. The world is a complicated place, there is complex context that one can’t control around every effort. Despite our best efforts, fortune has a role to play in terms of the degree to which the context swirling around us helps or hinders. We have been fortunate in every sense of the word and for that I am grateful. Our work is far from over. Each of our three projects has challenges and opportunities ahead. For Let’s Encrypt, which is more critical than ever and relatively mature, our focus over the next few years will be on long-term sustainability. More and more people working with certificates can’t recall a time when Let’s Encrypt didn’t exist, and most people who benefit from our service don’t need to know it exists at all (by design!). Let’s Encrypt is just part of how the Internet works now, which is great for many reasons, but it also means it’s at risk of being taken for granted. We are making sure that doesn’t happen so we can keep Let’s Encrypt running reliably and make investments in its future. Prossimo is making a huge amount of progress moving critical software infrastructure to memory safe code, from the Linux kernel to NTP, TLS, media codecs, and even sudo/su. We have two major challenges ahead of us here. The first is to raise the money we need to complete development work. The second is to get the safer software we’ve been building adopted widely. We feel pretty good about our plans but it’s not going to be easy. Things worth doing rarely are. Divvi Up is exciting technology with a bright future. Our biggest challenge here, like most things involving cryptography, is t
First reported May 24, 2023 00:00 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 17, 2026 02:46 UTCOpen evidence record
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A filename, label, or report mention alone does not establish maliciousness. Observation dates describe cited sources; collection dates describe this local metadata catalog. No malware samples are stored, fetched, or executed by these pages.