Misconfigured Resource-Based Policies
Common misconfigurations of resource-based policies and how they can be abused.
First reported Nov 24, 2022 22:14 UTCOpen evidence recordPublished file metadata, source observations, indicators, and research history in one bounded catalog.
Common misconfigurations of resource-based policies and how they can be abused.
First reported Nov 24, 2022 22:14 UTCOpen evidence recordRecovering and accessing files in private Storage Accounts that have been deleted.
First reported Mar 17, 2022 14:35 UTCOpen evidence recordHow to escalate privileges on an EC2 instance by abusing user data.
First reported Jan 21, 2024 17:59 UTCOpen evidence recordIn AWS, deleting and recreating an IAM role results in a new identity that breaks existing trust policies. This behavior improves security by preventing identity spoofing but can cause failures in cross-account access and third-party integrations if not properly understood.
First reported May 05, 2025 14:08 UTCOpen evidence recordInformation about the data an attacker can access via GCP's API endpoints
First reported Oct 24, 2021 17:41 UTCOpen evidence recordKnowing only the name of a public S3 bucket, you can ascertain the account ID it resides in.
First reported Apr 03, 2021 01:39 UTCOpen evidence recordBypass AWS Network Firewall Egress Filtering using SNI spoofing and Host Header manipulation.
First reported Sep 28, 2025 20:45 UTCOpen evidence recordHow to find and take advantage of exposed EBS snapshots.
First reported Dec 05, 2022 02:08 UTCOpen evidence recordGCP themed CTF
First reported Aug 29, 2022 00:18 UTCOpen evidence recordWith access to an ec2 instance, you will be able to identify the AWS account it runs in.
First reported Feb 27, 2022 22:50 UTCOpen evidence recordEnumerate AWS services via AWS Backup
First reported May 06, 2025 06:06 UTCOpen evidence recordHow to work with stolen IAM credentials and things to consider.
First reported May 14, 2022 21:51 UTCOpen evidence recordDuring an assessment you may find AWS IAM credentials. Use these tactics to identify the principal of the keys.
First reported Feb 09, 2022 04:00 UTCOpen evidence recordBrute force the IAM permissions of a user or role to see what you have access to.
First reported Dec 20, 2020 18:58 UTCOpen evidence recordBrute force the permissions of a service account to see what you have access to.
First reported Aug 23, 2022 14:34 UTCOpen evidence recordOverride the default botocore user-agent string in boto3 to prevent GuardDuty PenTest findings from firing.
First reported Mar 24, 2026 00:24 UTCOpen evidence recordDefault information on how accounts and service accounts exist in GCP
First reported May 29, 2022 13:26 UTCOpen evidence recordWith access to an EC2 instance you can intercept, modify, and spoof SSM communications.
First reported Feb 06, 2021 17:17 UTCOpen evidence recordUse sts:GetFederationToken to maintain access, even if the original IAM credentials are revoked.
First reported Sep 25, 2023 13:24 UTCOpen evidence recordA catalog of methods to maintain access to the AWS control plane.
First reported Aug 01, 2023 01:58 UTCOpen evidence recordAbuse IAM's eventual consistency to maintain persistence against incident response containment.
First reported Dec 14, 2025 12:53 UTCOpen evidence recordHow to convert an unique identifier to a principal ARN.
First reported Nov 20, 2023 00:54 UTCOpen evidence recordHow to take advantage of misconfigured Amazon Cognito Identity Pools.
First reported Jun 20, 2023 17:26 UTCOpen evidence recordTechniques to enumerate the account ID associated with an AWS access key.
First reported Sep 27, 2020 16:06 UTCOpen evidence recordA filename, label, or report mention alone does not establish maliciousness. Observation dates describe cited sources; collection dates describe this local metadata catalog. No malware samples are stored, fetched, or executed by these pages.