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Published file metadata, source observations, indicators, and research history in one bounded catalog.

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REPORT1 SOURCE

Copirate 365 at DEF CON: Plundering in the Depths of Microsoft Copilot (CVE-2026-24299)

This is a writeup of my DEF CON Singapore talk that walks through vulnerabilities and exploits in M365 Copilot and Consumer Copilot. I disclosed these to Microsoft last year. MSRC assigned CVE-2026-24299 and the issues are now patched. Contents This turned out to be a long post, covering the 45 minute talk. I added an index page, so you know what’s in here. The talk had a more demos by the way, bu

First reported May 04, 2026 13:00 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 08, 2026 03:44 UTCOpen evidence record
REPORT1 SOURCE

Security Advisory: Anthropic's Slack MCP Server Vulnerable to Data Exfiltration

This is a security advisory for a data leakage and exfiltration vulnerability in a popular, but now deprecated and unmaintained, Slack MCP Server from Anthropic. If you are using this MCP server, or run an “MCP Store” that hosts it, it is advised that you analyze how this threat applies to your use case and apply a patch as needed. Anthropic’s Slack MCP Server When Anthropic introduced MCP they pu

First reported Jun 24, 2025 23:00 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 08, 2026 03:44 UTCOpen evidence record
REPORT1 SOURCE

Hacking Google Bard - From Prompt Injection to Data Exfiltration

Recently Google Bard got some powerful updates, including Extensions. Extensions allow Bard to access YouTube, search for flights and hotels, and also to access a user’s personal documents and emails. So, Bard can now access and analyze your Drive, Docs and Gmail! This means that it analyzes untrusted data and will be susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection. I was able to quickly validate that Pr

First reported Nov 03, 2023 19:00 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 08, 2026 03:44 UTCOpen evidence record
REPORT1 SOURCE

Amp Code: Invisible Prompt Injection Fixed by Sourcegraph

In this post we will look at Amp, a coding agent from Sourcegraph. The other day we discussed how invisible instructions impact Google Jules. Turns out that many client applications are vulnerable to these kinds of attacks when they use models that support invisible instructions, like Claude. Invisible Unicode Tag Characters Interpreted as Instructions We have talked about hidden prompt injections

First reported Aug 16, 2025 19:20 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 08, 2026 03:44 UTCOpen evidence record
REPORT1 SOURCE

AI Kill Chain in Action: Devin AI Exposes Ports to the Internet with Prompt Injection

Today let’s explore Devin’s system prompt a bit more. Specifically, an interesing tool that I discovered when reading through it. Hidden in Devin’s capabilities is a tool that can open any local port to the public Internet. That means, with the right indirect prompt injection nudge, Devin can be tricked into publishing sensitive files or services for anyone to access.

First reported Aug 08, 2025 07:02 UTCCatalog metadata updated Oct 08, 2026 03:44 UTCOpen evidence record

A filename, label, or report mention alone does not establish maliciousness. Observation dates describe cited sources; collection dates describe this local metadata catalog. No malware samples are stored, fetched, or executed by these pages.