Disclosure summary
MISP contains a race condition in the email-based one-time password (OTP) login flow. When two HTTP requests carrying the same valid OTP are submitted concurrently, both can successfully authenticate and establish a session. The root cause is that the OTP value is read from the shared store, validated, and then deleted in separate non-atomic steps, allowing a second in-flight request to read the same value before the first request's deletion takes effect. Preconditions: - The target MISP instance has email OTP login enabled. - The attacker possesses a valid, unexpired OTP (e.g., via email interception or social engineering). - The attacker can issue two HTTP POST requests in close temporal proximity. Impact: - The one-time-use guarantee of the OTP is violated; a single code can yield two authenticated sessions. - This weakens the authentication control and may facilitate unauthorized access if the OTP is shared or intercepted. Affected versions:
Source-reported weakness categories
CWE-362, CWE-367
Source-specific records & product guidance
Sources retain their own attribution and scoring. Follow the original record to confirm affected versions, fixed releases, and configuration conditions.
NIST National Vulnerability Database · NVD-CVE-2026-107276
Open original source · Updated Oct 07, 2026
Only CPE matches marked vulnerable=true are indexed. AND/OR platform conditions must be checked in the original NVD record.
Original records & references
PUBLISHED 2026-10-07T12:17:47-04:00
MODIFIED 2026-10-07T17:17:14-04:00
INGESTED 2026-10-10T20:50:09-04:00