Disclosure summary
Apache Airflow's serialization layer reconstructed exception nodes by calling `import_string()` on a class name taken from the serialized blob and instantiating it with arguments from the same blob, with no restriction on what could be imported. An operator's `executor_config` reaches that branch, so a Dag author could place a value there that causes an arbitrary callable to be imported and invoked -- for example `subprocess.check_output`, or `builtins.eval` on the `builtins`-prefixed variant. The code runs in the **Scheduler**, which reconstructs serialized Dags in its normal loop with no request involved, and in the **API server**, on any authenticated read of the Dag such as `GET /api/v2/dags/{dag_id}/details`. Both are components the Airflow security model states must never execute Dag-author code, and both hold the metadata database credentials and the JWT signing secret. No non-default configuration is required. This is a **different sink from CVE-2026-33264**, which covered only the trigger branch of the same deserializer: deployments that upgraded in response to that advisory are still affected through the exception branch and must upgrade again. Users are advised to upgrad
Source-specific records & product guidance
Sources retain their own attribution and scoring. Follow the original record to confirm affected versions, fixed releases, and configuration conditions.
GitHub Reviewed Security Advisories · GHSA-8prw-8m6x-8w6f
Open original source · Updated Oct 02, 2026
Apache Airflow exception-node deserialization permits arbitrary callable execution
Source severity: HIGH / 0
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | First patched |
|---|---|---|---|
| pip | apache-airflow | >= 3.3.0, < 3.3.1 | 3.3.1 |
Original records & references
- NIST NVD record
- CVE Program record
- github.com — Reviewed advisory
PUBLISHED 2026-08-12T14:31:17-04:00
MODIFIED 2026-10-02T19:12:36-04:00
INGESTED 2026-10-06T11:45:17-04:00