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Δ / VULNERABILITY RECORD

CVE-2026-71887.

Source-reported disclosure and enrichment record.

SEVERITY / CVSSHIGH / 8.2CVSS 4.0 · 91579145-5d7b-4cc5-b925-a0262ff19630
EXPLOITATION STATUSNot listed in the cached KEV catalogThis does not establish absence of exploitation.
RECORD STATUSAwaiting AnalysisModified Oct 06, 2026

Disclosure summary

In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP API accepted a data signature made by a signing subkey whose Subkey Binding signature carried no embedded Primary Key Binding (cross-certification) signature, in the case where that binding omits a Key Flags subpacket. RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.1.8 and sec. 10.1.3 require the embedded Primary Key Binding signature on any subkey that can issue signatures; it is the subkey's own statement that it belongs to the primary key it is bound under. OpenPGPCertificate resolved the subkey's key flags two different ways. isSigningKey() goes through getKeyFlags() and getApplyingSubpacket(), which falls back to the primary key's direct-key or primary User ID self-signature when the binding signature omits the subpacket, so the subkey inherited the primary's SIGN_DATA and counted as signing-capable; verifyEmbeddedPrimaryKeyBinding(), which enforces the requirement, reads the binding signature's own hashed subpackets, found no SIGN_DATA there, and returned early as a non-signing key without ever demanding the back signature. The same subkey was therefore signing-capable - so its signatures were attributed to the certificate and OpenPGPSignature.OpenPGPDocumentSignature.isValid() returned true - while being exempt from cross-certification, where GnuPG refuses the identical certificate and message. An attacker needs only the victim's public signing subkey, which is public material: they bind it to their own primary key with a Subkey Binding signature they are able to make, carrying no Key Flags and no embedded Primary Key Binding signature, which they cannot make without the subkey's private key, and a relying party verifying one of the victim's genuinely signed messages against that certificate is told the signature is valid and give

Source-reported weakness categories

CWE-345, CWE-347

Source-specific records & product guidance

Sources retain their own attribution and scoring. Follow the original record to confirm affected versions, fixed releases, and configuration conditions.

NIST National Vulnerability Database · NVD-CVE-2026-71887

Open original source · Updated Oct 06, 2026

Only CPE matches marked vulnerable=true are indexed. AND/OR platform conditions must be checked in the original NVD record.

Original records & references

PUBLISHED 2026-10-03T05:17:05-04:00
MODIFIED 2026-10-06T10:49:40-04:00
INGESTED 2026-10-06T11:45:30-04:00