CVE-2026-73605.

Disclosure summary

### Summary `/api/file/getUniqueFilename` takes a path from the request body and passes it to a filesystem existence check with no validation, confinement or authorization. The response distinguishes paths that exist from paths that do not, so an anonymous reader in publish mode can probe arbitrary locations on the host, one request per probe. Files and directories both work. Every neighbouring file route either requires an administrator or confines the path first. ### Details **Route.** `kernel/api/router.go:289` on master, `:292` on the development branch, `CheckAuth` only. **Handler,** `kernel/api/file.go:84`, in full: ```go util.ParseJsonArgs(arg, ret, util.BindJsonArg("path", &filePath, true, true)) ret.Data = map[string]any{"path": util.GetUniqueFilename(filePath)} ``` **The argument binder does no path handling.** `util.BindJsonArg` (`kernel/util/net.go:365`) takes two booleans, `required` (the key must be present) and `rejectEmpty` (the value must be non-empty). That is its entire contract. There is no `filepath.Clean`, no workspace join, no traversal check. An absolute path outside the workspace reaches `gulu.File.IsExist` unmodified. **The oracle.** `util/file.go:67`: ```

Source-specific records & product guidance

Sources retain their own attribution and scoring. Follow the original record to confirm affected versions, fixed releases, and configuration conditions.

Original records & references

• NIST NVD record
• CVE Program record
• github.com — Reviewed advisory

PUBLISHED 2026-10-01T11:46:01-04:00
MODIFIED 2026-10-01T11:46:03-04:00
INGESTED 2026-10-06T11:45:02-04:00