Disclosure summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: selinux: preserve user SID across nested backing files SELinux saves the user file SID in a backing-file security blob so it remains available after mmap() replaces vma->vm_file with a backing file. For nested backing files (overlayfs over overlayfs, or FUSE passthrough backed by overlayfs), user_file may itself be a backing file. Its fsec->sid is the SID of the mounter that opened it, rather than the user that opened the top-level file. mprotect() then checks fd { use } against the mounter SID. This can incorrectly deny access without a domain transition, or check the wrong target SID after one. Copy the saved user SID when user_file is a backing file. Keep using the regular file SID for the first backing layer. With two nested overlayfs mounts and SELinux enforcing, mprotect(PROT_READ) returns EACCES with an fd { use } denial against the mounter SID. With this change, mprotect() succeeds. Tested on arm64 QEMU with a small BusyBox initramfs and a purpose-built SELinux policy. The original test was also repeated with Fedora Cloud Base 44 userspace and gave the same result.
Source-specific records & product guidance
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NIST National Vulnerability Database · NVD-CVE-2026-98215
Open original source · Updated Oct 06, 2026
Only CPE matches marked vulnerable=true are indexed. AND/OR platform conditions must be checked in the original NVD record.
Original records & references
- NIST NVD record
- CVE Program record
- git.kernel.org
- git.kernel.org
- git.kernel.org
- git.kernel.org
- git.kernel.org
PUBLISHED 2026-10-06T05:18:08-04:00
MODIFIED 2026-10-06T05:18:08-04:00
INGESTED 2026-10-06T11:45:53-04:00